One of the most important and controversial issues in trade policy surrounds the environmental consequences of globalization. While prior empirical research suggests little adverse effect of trade on the environment, these studies face at least one of two criticisms: either they utilize cross-country data, which calls into question the reliability and consistency of the data, as well as the homogeneity of the sample, or they utilize subnational data from a single country, which calls into question the generalizability of intranational trade effects to the international arena. This paper circumvents these issues by assessing the impact of intra-and international trade on the environment in a cohesive framework. We begin by providing a theoretical motivation for why intranational and international trade may have differential effects on environmental quality. In particular, the theory predicts a beneficial effect of both types of trade on the environment, with international trade having a stronger impact. We test these hypotheses empirically using data on intra-and international trade in the US and Canada, along with several measures of environmental quality. Our results are consonant with the existing literature; namely, there is little evidence of harmful effects of either intra-or international trade. Moreover, our preferred estimates indicate a stronger, beneficial impact of international trade.
Introduction
On an average day, CDN$1.7 billion worth of goods travels across the US-Canada border. 1 As sizeable as this amount of trade is, it is dwarfed by the value of movements across borders internal to the US and Canada. In 1997, US interstate shipments were $10.7 billion per day. 2 Internal trade in Canada is much smaller; in 1996 interprovincial trade was CDN$0.44 billion per day (Page 2002) . What is the impact, if any, of this within-country and between-country trade on the environment? Are there differential effects of within-and between-country trade on the environment? In other words, what role do national borders play in the trade-environment debate? These are the questions we explore in this paper.
The importance of such questions cannot be overstated. The debate over the environmental impacts of trade began more than a decade ago and is yet to be settled, despite the fact that many recent studies empirically document a positive relationship between greater international trade and national measures of environmental quality. These studies have failed, however, to quell the debate because it is unclear whether the positive relationship merely reflects a spurious correlation between trade volumes and the environment; countries with "sound" and politically stable governments are more likely both to protect their environments and to have well developed trade relationships with other countries.
In an effort to determine if the positive relationship documented in these earlier studies does, in fact, represent a beneficial causal effect of greater international trade on the environment, Frankel and Rose (2005) utilize cross-country data on the extent to which countries trade with other countries and numerous national measures of environmental quality. To estimate the causal effect of trade, the authors utilize twostage least squares (TSLS). The instrumental variable used to identify the causal effect of trade is derived from a first-stage "gravity" model of bilateral trade flows. In effect, the technique utilizes cross-country variation in trade arising from geographical determinants of trade (e.g., proximity to other countries, landlocked status, shared colonial ties, etc.) to identify the causal effect of greater trade on environmental quality. While the use of TSLS represents a significant advance over previous studies, the results were consistent; the authors, at worst, find no causal impact of trade on environmental quality, and, at best, find a beneficial impact.
Despite the advance offered in Frankel and Rose (2005) , one potential criticism of their analysis is that the use of data on trade levels and environmental quality across a diverse set of countries, from a wide array of sources, makes the data suspect. For example, differences across countries in the measurement of trade levels and/or environmental degradation, or differences in the level of governmental honesty, may mask the "true" causal effect of trade on environmental quality. To circumvent this possibility, Chintrakarn and Millimet (2006) revisit the analysis in Frankel and Rose (2005) using data on shipments across US states and state-level measures of pollution. Using the same TSLS procedure as Frankel and Rose (2005) , the 1 Authors' own calculation based on 2006 data from Statistics Canada, CANSIM, Table 228 -0003, summarized at http://www40.statcan.ca/l01/cst01/gblec02a.htm. 2 Authors' own calculation based on the Commodity Flow Survey (CFS) data from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics; description available at http://www.bts.gov/programs/commodity_flow_survey/.
authors investigate the causal effect of intranational trade on the environment. The motivation behind the analysis is that intranational trade is similar to international trade, but the use of subnational data from one country (the US) ensures data comparability, as well as a more homogeneous sample. Again, the results were consistent with the previous literature: intranational trade has, at worst, no impact on state-level pollution, and, at best, a positive causal effect on environmental quality.
Given the fact that the results in Chintrakarn and Millimet (2006) support the findings in Frankel and Rose (2005) , it might seem as if the debate over the environmental consequences of trade has been resolved.
Unfortunately, there remains a potential hole in this chain of reasoning. Specifically, for the conclusions drawn in Chintrakarn and Millimet (2006) to extend from intranational to international trade, one must assume that trade at the subnational and international levels have the same impact on the environment.
However, there is no existing literature exploring this issue. This paper fills this gap, offering, to our knowledge, the first rigorous analysis of the environmental effects of intranational versus international trade. Does the final destination of exported goods impact the environmental effects of trade?
To begin, we develop a theoretical model distinguishing between the environmental effects of intra-and international trade in each of two countries. One of the hallmarks of our model is that it incorporates the stylized fact that much of the trade between and within industrialized nations is intra-industry (i.e., for many product codes, each country is both an importer and an exporter). This is crucial given that we empirically test our theoretical model on US-Canadian data, where -according to Vogiatzoglou's (2006) calculations -the Grubel-Lloyd (G-L) index was 0.593 for US-Canada bilateral manufacturing trade in 2002; roughly 59% of US-Canada manufacturing trade was within the same 4-digit SIC codes. 3 Our theoretical model yields two testable hypotheses. First, unless income effects are sufficiently weak, greater trade of either type is beneficial to the environment. Second, the positive impacts of trade on the environment are greater for international trade than for intranational trade.
The logic underlying our hypotheses is as follows. Trade grants consumers access to a broader variety of goods than only those produced locally. This access may impact environmental policy through two channels. The first channel -referred to as the decoupling effect -arises because the link between local environmental regulation and consumer welfare is weak when a locality (i.e. state or province) is outwardly oriented. Specifically, consumers in localities that import numerous varieties from other (domestic or foreign) localities will find that locally produced goods constitute only a small fraction of their overall consumption. Thus, even though the variety and real price of domestically produced goods may be impacted by domestic regulation, overall consumer welfare will be relatively stable. In sum, trade decouples consumer welfare from the costs of local regulation, making stricter domestic regulation more attractive.
The second channel -referred to as the income effect -arises since access to increased variety has welfare benefits akin to outright improvements in per capita income. Broda These two effects -the decoupling and income effects -each indicate a beneficial causal effect of intra-and international trade on the environment. The income effect should be invariant to the type of trade. However, the decoupling effect will most likely be stronger for international trade. Many of the rules governing pollution in Canada and the US are set federally. This means that the price and variety of goods imported into Alberta from, say, Ontario, are not independent of the regulations impacting Albertan producers. Thus, the extent to which trade decouples consumption bundles from regulation is substantially weaker for intranational trade. Nonetheless, since some pollution regulations are set at the local level (or federal rules are differentially enforced across localities), we expect intranational trade to induce some decoupling, but less than would occur with the same degree of international trade.
We test our hypotheses using data on interstate commerce, interprovincial commerce, and international trade between US states and Canadian provinces in 1997 and 2002. We use this data to construct measures of the "intensity" of intra-and international trade in which each locality is engaged. We match this to several measures of environmental quality at the state and province level. As in the recent literature, we also control for the potential endogeneity of trade flows using instrumental variables derived from a gravity model of trade flows. Moreover, as in Chintrakarn and Millimet (2006) and Frankel and Rose (2005) , we also allow per capita income to be endogenous as well.
Our results are striking. First and foremost, our results are consonant with the existing literature.
Specifically, there is little evidence of harmful effects of either intra-or international trade, and in many cases greater trade intensity is found to be beneficial. Second, when we do not include state and province fixed effects in the estimation, which given the identification strategy are our preferred estimates, we find fairly robust evidence that greater international trade is more beneficial for the environment than intranational trade. However, we do note that when we include state and province fixed effects there is no clear ranking among the two types of trade. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our theoretical framework. Section 3 outlines the empirical model, describes the data, and presents the results. Section 4 concludes.
Theoretical Model
We consider a world with two regions, Home and Foreign, that engage in free and frictionless trade; values for Foreign are denoted with asterisks. Each country is endowed with a generic input L (L * ), which is used to produce a differentiated product; we will refer to L as labor, although other interpretations are equally valid. Factor productivity is increasing in the emission intensity, e, of production. Specifically, we assume the effective factor supply is given by ϕ(e)L, where ϕ is an increasing, concave function with elasticity ϕ0(e)e ϕ ≡ σ > 0; for brevity we will regularly suppress the argument e. Production incurs fixed and variable costs aw/ϕ and w/ϕ, respectively, where w is the wage for a nominal unit of labor. Thus, for output y i of variety i of the differentiated good, total production costs are
ϕ(e) . Let n (n * ) denote the number of varieties produced in Home (Foreign); define the set of varieties produced in Home (Foreign) as N (N * ), and the set of global varieties as N G = N ∪ N * . We follow the Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz (SDS) model of intra-industry trade, assuming consumers have constant elasticity of substitution preferences over the range of differentiated products. For simplicity, we assume there is a single consumer in each country. In particular, assume the consumer's utility from consuming the global range of varieties n + n * is a monotonic transformation of
where c i is Home consumption of variety i; assume ρ ∈ (0, 1). For any variety i, Home consumption c i is the sum of domestic production y i plus imports m i ; imports may be negative. For future reference, define
We can interpret C as the Home consumer's variety-adjusted consumption. Because production exhibits increasing returns to scale, sets N and N * are disjoint (i.e. each firm produces a different variety). Hence, if y i > 0 for some particular variety i, m i is non-positive.
Given (1) consumer demands are as follows:
where GN P = wL is national income. As is usual in models with SDS preferences, we assume n+n * is large from the firm perspective; thus, each firm i ∈ N maximizes its profits by setting own price p i = w ϕρ ; prices are therefore identical for goods produced within a country. We assume there is free entry. Because firms are symmetric, free entry entails zero long run profits: 
We assume wages equilibrate so as to maintain factor and goods market equilibrium. In particular, w and w * must satisfy
Normalizing w * ≡ 1, the above implies that in equilibrium
while
Full employment requires n[y +a] = Lϕ. Ignoring the whole numbers constraint on variety, substituting for y = a/β gives
Substituting equilibrium values for GN P , p, n and n * into (2) and simplifying gives per variety consumption
In what follows, the ratio
will be useful. η measures Home's share of global product variety. Not surprisingly, Home's variety share is increasing in its own nominal factor endowment L and productivity ϕ and decreasing in equivalent Foreign values L * and ϕ * . Substituting into (7) gives
for all n + n * goods, while substituting into (1) gives
where ξ ≡
Home's consumption of a particular variety is increasing in η. η reflects Home's share of the global supply of effective inputs. Not surprisingly, the larger Home's share of inputs, the larger its share of consumption. However, η and C are negatively correlated. Holding Home's effective factor supply constant, a higher value of η translates to fewer global varieties and lower utility for consumers with "love of variety" preferences.
Policy Choice
We assume emission intensity e is determined directly by policy; in our baseline case, we assume Home and Foreign are in separate jurisdictions and Home treats Foreign's intensity e * as fixed. The economic impact of regulation comes via productivity. Raising e raises ϕ which raises effective factor supply ϕL and, from (4) and (5), raises the real wage w/p. On the environmental side, raising e raises emission intensity, directly raising pollution.
To examine how government balances this myriad of concerns, we posit the following preferences over private goods and environmental quality
where U measures Home's welfare from composite consumption C and emissions Z = eny. 4 Substituting for C using (10), differentiating with respect to e and collecting terms gives
Define e o as the value of e that equates (11) with zero; U is locally concave in e (see Appendix) and so e o is Home's optimal emission policy.
Inspecting (11) we see that optimal policy depends on η, Home's variety share.
Proposition 1
Holding L and variety-adjusted consumption C constant, exogenously reducing Home's variety share η lowers Home's optimal emission intensity e o and Home's total emissions.
Proof. Since the second order conditions for an interior maximum are satisfied, by the envelope de o dη > 0. As noted above, lowering e lowers w/p and n; regulation imposes costs in terms of diminished real wages and variety. The importance of this change in n depends on η. A low value of η signals that local consumption bundles are composed largely of imported goods; consequently, dn/de is relatively unimportant for overall variety when η is small. As a result, the variety costs of regulation are relatively insignificant. Moreover, the smaller the costs from regulation, the smaller will be permissible emissions.
Trade Intensity
The share of domestically produced goods in Home's overall consumption basket is directly linked to Home's trade intensity. To see this, consider the condition for trade balance: the value of total imports, M ≡ P n * j * m j * p * , must equal the value of total exports X ≡
Using equations (3) - (6) and (9), as well as the definition of GNP, gives the following expression for Home's trade intensity
This mathematical relationship is intuitive. Suppose the number of Foreign varieties, n * , rises. Home's imports M will also rise as Home's consumer reallocates her budget toward the increased array of foreign types. She finances spending on new foreign goods by reducing her consumption of pre-existing types, exporting a higher fraction of domestically produced goods in order to finance her increased imports; X and M both rise while GN P is unchanged, raising Home's trade intensity.
Using the relationship between variety share and trade intensity, we offer the following corollary of Moreover, unlike previous authors who examine undifferentiated goods, we face the additional empirical obstacle of not being able to control for composite consumption C. Thus, we must account theoretically for any correlation between C and trade intensity. Substituting X+M GNP into (10) gives
Holding Home's factor supply L constant, we see C is increasing in X+M GNP given ρ < 1. Accordingly, we revisit our comparative static exercise to allow C to vary endogenously. For this, we define the following variable μ ≡ − u 00 (C)C u 0 (C) ; we can interpret μ as the income elasticity of the marginal damage from pollution. 5 Proposition 2 Holding L constant, an exogenous reduction in Home's variety share has an ambiguous effect on Home's optimal emission intensity e o . Reducing η lowers e o if and only if
5 Following Copeland and Taylor (2003) , the marginal damage (MD)-"the money measure of the willingness to pay to reduce emissions" (p.62)-from pollution is given by MD = −
where I measures income. Holding prices and
in our model, and so the income elasticity of MD is
Proof. By the envelope theorem
which is positive when (14) holds.
Corollary 2 Holding L constant, trade intensity is negatively correlated with emissions unless income effects are sufficiently weak.
When C is endogenous, emissions and trade intensity are ambiguously correlated. As discussed above, the greater Home's trade intensity the weaker the link between local regulation and global product varietythe decoupling effect. But when C is endogenous, we must also be concerned with the impact of trade intensity on the relative weight citizens place on private consumption versus disutility from pollution.
Economists have long argued that environmental quality is a normal good; as citizens grow richer they tend to want more of it. Stated in terms of our economic model, income growth finances the consumption of conventional goods, lowering the marginal rate of substitution between private consumption and environmental quality. Trade can be the impetus for consumption-driven changes in demand for environmental policy. Grossman and Krueger (1993) and Copeland and Taylor (2003) argue that trade increases income thereby fueling demand for stricter techniques of production-the technique effect of trade. In our model, an increase in GNP is unnecessary; an increase in variety n+n * (accompanied by a commensurate reduction in per variety consumption so as to keep the total number of units consumed P n+n * c, and thus spending, constant), raises C and lowers the marginal rate of substitution between private and public goods when
On the other hand, reducing η changes the set of consumption choices. When there are more varieties available, real wages lost to environmental regulation are more valuable, rendering strict emission controls less appealing.
Combined, the two effects described above constitute the income effect of a change in C. Whether this income effect promotes strict or weak regulation depends on μ, the income elasticity of marginal damage.
The size of μ is the subject of empirical debate. One approach is to measure the elasticity of observed environmental quality with respect to income. Antle and Heidebrink (1995) examine afforestation and parkland provision in a cross section of countries and conclude that "the income elasticity of demand for environmental services...[for high income countries is] positive and generally greater than one" (p.618).
Using international panel data, Shafik (1994) Accordingly, while we feel confident in assuming μ > 0, we cannot rule out the possibility that it is less than unity.
If μ is positive but less than unity, the sign of
dη is ambiguous. To see this, recognize that the right hand term in (14) is monotonically decreasing in η, ranging from unity to zero as η increases from zero to one. Thus, if η is sufficiently small to begin with and μ < 1, then trade intensity and emissions may be positively correlated. This means that for provinces or states with low trade intensity, it is possible that a negative net income effect dominates the decoupling effect, rendering trade intensity bad for the environment. However, even if μ < 1, Another issue we must address is what might drive changes in Home's trade intensity. In the analysis thus far, we have treated changes in X+M GN P as exogenous and assumed L does not change. This is consistent with, for example, an exogenous increase in L * . 6 However, a decline in Home's own factor supply would also affect its trade intensity; from (8) , dη/dL > 0. The decoupling effect from reducing L will be proenvironment, as discussed above, but because reducing L also lowers both n and Home income, the net income effect will be anti-environment (if μ > 1). Moreover, a change in Home's factor supply also has a scale effect which impacts policy directly; lowering L shrinks Home's pollution base. Collectively, these responses suggest the pro-environment effect of increasing trade intensity via domestic factor contraction will be muted by an anti-environment effect of declining consumption utility and industrial activity.
Empirical Prediction 2 State/province factor size amplifies the correlation between emissions and trade intensity. 6 Partially differentiating (11) with respect to L * gives
which is negative if and only if (14) holds.
Intranational Trade Intensity
To this point, the analysis has focused on trade between jurisdictions. A central question in this paper is how and whether trade between regions in the same jurisdiction should have the same impact on the environment as inter-jurisdictional trade. To answer this we examine the policy choice of a regulator whose jurisdictional scope includes both Home and its trade partner Foreign; we assume the regulator puts equal weight on Home and Foreign welfare and sets uniform policy. The first of these assumptions is not important for our results, but the second is critical, as shown below.
Define e J as the emission policy that maximizes the joint welfare of Home and Foreign consumers/citizens:
where
when set equal to zero.
The measure of Home's variety share, η, is conspicuously absent from (15) . When the regulator has jurisdiction over the whole universe of product varieties consumed in Home (and Foreign), stricter regulation reduces the productivity of all factors of production, regardless of whether they are located in Home or
Foreign. As a result, the relationship between regulation and consumer options is independent of the degree of interstate trade. This is in contrast to the case of international trade; when Home and Foreign are in different jurisdictions, regulation impacting Home leaves n * unaffected and so Home (and Foreign) consumers are increasingly insulated from the impacts of a change in e when η is smaller.
What does this suggest about the correlation between measures of intra-jurisdictional trade intensity and environmental regulation? If variety-adjusted consumption is held constant, we would expect intrajurisdictional trade intensity to have no impact on environmental regulation.
As mentioned earlier, it is difficult to measure variety-adjusted consumption directly, and increased trade in differentiated goods likely correlates with increased variety. Thus, we anticipate that an increase in Home's interstate trade intensity has net income effects as described in section 2.2, but none of the associated decoupling effects.
Empirical Prediction 3
Intranational trade intensity has a smaller positive impact on the environment than does international trade intensity.
Empirics

Econometric Model
To assess the impact of the trade intensity measures on pollution, controlling for other potential determinants of pollution, we estimate models of the basic form
where P OLL ict is a measure of pollution in location i (a state or province) in country c (US or Canada)
at time t, INT ER − T RADE and INT RA − T RADE are measures of the inter-and intranational trade intensity of location i, respectively, GDP/P OP is per capita GDP, Z is a vector of other location-specific attributes (discussed below), and ε ict is a mean zero error term that is allowed to be arbitrarily correlated within state/province over time. A test of whether the impact of intra-and international trade have similar impacts on the environment is obtained by testing the null hypothesis that β 1 = β 2 . In addition, we also test the null hypothesis that intra-and international trade intensity are jointly statistically significant.
To obtain unbiased estimates of the parameters in (16), we require our two trade measures, as well as per capita GDP, to be uncorrelated with unobservable determinants of pollution conditional on the set of covariates, X. As discussed above, this is not likely to be the case. Thus, we proceed as in Frankel and Rose The multilateral resistance terms are specific to each state or province and time period, but do not vary across trading partners within a time period. Thus, consistent estimates can be obtained by including the complete set of state/province by time dummies. Here, we specify the first-stage equation as
where X ijt is shipments from state or province i to state or province j in year t, λ it (λ jt ) are state/province i (j) by time effects, W ijt is a vector of controls corresponding to trading partners i and j in year t, and u ijt is a possibly heteroskedastic error term with mean one. W includes the (log) distance between trading pair, the interaction between distance and a dummy variable indicating whether the exporting region is a US state, the interaction between distance and a dummy variable indicating whether the importing region is a US state, a home dummy variable equal to one if i = j (implying intrastate or intraprovincial shipments), the interaction between the home dummy and a dummy variable indicating whether the exporting region is a US state, a dummy variable indicating whether i and j are contiguous neighbors, the interaction between the adjacency dummy and a dummy variable indicating whether the exporting region is a US state, and a dummy variable equal to one if i and j are located in different countries (implying international shipments).
Other commonly included gravity controls that do not vary across trading partner (e.g., GDP or population)
are captured in the λ terms.
Equation (17) may be estimated using standard fixed effects methods after taking logs of both sides.
This is the conventional strategy, and such an estimation procedure will yield consistent estimates of the Henderson and Millimet (2008) find that the estimation of (17) in levels using PPML outperforms the log-linear model using US intranational trade data. Thus, we utilize the same estimator for the first-stage.
Data 3.2.1 Trade Intensity
To estimate the empirical model, we first require data on interstate commerce, interprovincial commerce, With the trade data in hand, we define intranational trade intensity as
where the numerator reflects the sum of "exports'' plus "imports'' from other localities in the same country c and the denominator is the sum of all exports (to all localities in the US and Canada, including shipments that remain in the same state or province). 10 We define international trade intensity as
where the numerator reflects the sum of exports plus imports from localities in the other country c 0 and the denominator is identical to (18) . 7 See http://www.bea.gov/industry/index.htm#annual. 8 Obtained at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/81946.pdf. 9 Obtained at http://www.bankofcanada.ca/en/rates/exchange_avg_pdf.html. 10 Table 2 and accord with the literature; namely, an adverse effect of distance on bilateral trade and a large role for borders (the US-Canadian border as well as state and province borders). Interestingly, the results indicate that exports originating in US states are less sensitive to distance, but internal shipments (i.e., those that do not cross any border) are higher in US states on average than Canadian provinces.
Environmental Quality
We measure environmental quality using two measures: releases of toxic chemicals and carbon dioxide Pollution data for Canada come from the Canadian National Pollutant Release Inventory (NPRI), and are obtained through Pollution Watch. 11 Under Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999, companies that manufacture, process, or otherwise use one of 341 covered substances beyond the specified threshold are required to provide facility-specific information regarding on-site releases and off-site transfers. The covered substances are grouped into five categories, and the thresholds for required reporting vary by category. For the core substances, facilities must submit a report if 10 tonnes or more are manufactured, processed, or otherwise used and employees (including contractors) worked more than 20,000 hours at the facility. 12 For both the TRI and NPRI, the list of chemicals firms are required to report, as well as the requirements for who must file a report, has evolved over time. For instance, while minor additions and deletions are made virtually every year to the TRI list of covered chemicals, 286 new chemicals were added beginning in 1995. Similarly, the NPRI included 176 chemicals in 1996, and now includes over 300 substances. To capture the increase in pollution that occurs over time simply due to the expansion in covered chemicals and firms, we include separate time dummies for each country.
For the analysis, chemical releases are aggregated to the state or provincial level using five different categories: on-site releases to the air, on-site releases to the water, combined on-and off-site land releases and underground injections, total releases (the sum of the three previous categories), and total releases of 11 See http://www.pollutionwatch.org/. 12 For other reporting thresholds, see http://www.ec.gc.ca/pdb/npri/2006Guidance/brochure2006/brochure2006_e.cfm. just carcinogenic chemicals. While the definitions of the first four categories seems comparable across the TRI and NPRI, the list of chemicals deemed to be carcinogenic differ at least to some extent. The TRI uses a list of carcinogenic chemicals as determined by the US Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), whereas the NPRI uses the chemical list compiled by the State of California under Proposition 65. As stated above, country-specific time effects are used to control for measurement differences.
Finally, we also measure environmental quality using aggregate CO 2 emissions. The US data are obtained from the Energy Information Administration within the US Department of Energy. 13 
Remaining Variables
In terms of the remaining variables utilized in (16) , per capita GDP for US states is obtained using GDP data from the BEA, while state population is obtained from the US Census Bureau. Corresponding provincial data come from Statistics Canada, CANSIM. 15 Control variables included in Z are population density, defined as ln(area/pop) where area is the total state or provincial area in square kilometers, and the local unemployment rate measured at the state or provincial level. 16 As in Chintrakarn and Millimet (2006) and Frankel and Rose (2005) , the inclusion of land area allows for an effect of population density on the environment. The unemployment rate may affect current preferences regarding environmental protection or enforcement. 13 See http://www.eia.doe.gov/environment.html. 14 The lowest ratio of carbon dioxide to total GHG emissions in 2005 is for Saskatchewan (0.59), while the highest is for Nova Scotia (0.92). Note, to the extent that this approximation procedure introduces classical measurement error, the results is only to reduce the efficiency of the estimates; the estimates remain consistent. 15 Provincial GDP data are obtained from Distance between states and provinces is measured as the minimum driving distance between the most populated city in each locality. For the US, the data come from Wolf (2000) . For interprovincial and stateprovince distances, the data are obtained online. 17 Finally, within state or province distance (i.e., internal distance) is borrowed from Wolf (2000) and Millimet and Osang (2007) ; namely, one-half the distance to the closest neighbor.
Finally, additional instruments included in the GMM estimation of (16) and Statistics Canada, CANSIM. 18 These variables are designed to reflect human capital and labor inputs, and thus should be correlated with per capita GDP and its quadratic. Tables 3-6 present the results, with Tables 3 and 4 Thus, we linearly interpolate the data to obtain values for 1997 and 2002. 19 The null hypothesis in the Kleibergen-Paap test is that the model is underidentified. Thus, rejection of null provides
Results
Turning to the OLS results (Panel A, Tables 3 and 4) , we obtain three main findings. First, we find that greater intensity of either type of trade is often statistically associated with improved environmental quality; we never find evidence of a statistically significant, positive effect on toxic releases or CO 2 emissions.
Second, across all six outcomes, we always reject the null that the trade variables are jointly insignificant at conventional confidence levels in Specifications I and II. Moreover, while we never reject equality of the two trade variables in these specifications, it is noteworthy that in Specification II (allowing for separate time effects by country), the coefficient on international trade intensity is more negative for all six pollution measures. Third, aside from toxic water releases (Table 3) , we always fail to reject the null that the trade variables are jointly insignificant, as well as the equality of the two trade variables.
While interesting, as noted previously in the literature, the endogeneity of trade and income make the causal interpretation of the OLS results suspect. Panel B in Tables 3 and 4 present the corresponding GMM results. Prior to examining the coefficient estimates, note that Specifications I and II by and large fare well in terms of the diagnostic tests; we fail to reject the null that the model is underidentified in Specification III. Thus, we focus on Specifications I and II.
In terms of the results, we again point to three main findings. First, as in the previous OLS results, greater intensity of either type of trade often has a statistically significant, negative effect on pollution, and we never obtain any statistically significant, positive coefficients. Moreover, the Anderson-Rubin test always rejects the null that the trade variables are jointly insignificant. Thus, there is no evidence that trade -intranational or international -is harmful to the environment, and some evidence to the contrary.
Second, for five of the six pollution measures (toxic water releases excluded), we reject equality of the two trade variables, with the coefficient on international trade intensity being more negative in each case. Even in the case of water releases, the coefficient on international trade intensity is more negative. This affirms the prediction of our theoretical model.
Finally, the results are economically significant. For instance, a 10% increase in international trade intensity for the average locality, ceteris paribus, leads to a 18% (9%) reduction in total toxic releases (CO 2 emissions). A similar increase in intranational trade intensity, ceteris paribus, leads to a 6% (5%) reduction.
Next, we turn to Tables 5 and 6 , where we include state and province fixed effects. Given the sample size, the results should perhaps be interpreted a bit cautiously. Nonetheless, we present the results. Panel A displays the fixed effects estimates. For toxic air and water releases, none of the trade variables are individually statistically significant; we also fail to reject the null that they are jointly insignificant. For land/underground and total toxic releases, we reject the null that the two trade variables are jointly insignificant. Moreover, only the coefficients on intranational trade intensity are negative and statistically significant in each specification, but we fail to reject equality between the two trade variables in each case. Finally, for releases of carcinogens and CO 2 emissions, we reject the null that the two trade variables are jointly insignificant, as well as equality of the two trade effects. Specifically, contrary to the theoretical model, greater intranational trade intensity is associated with improved environmental quality using these measure, whereas international trade intensity is not.
Given that the fixed effects analysis in Panel A only addresses bias due to omitted time invariant unobservables, it is still necessary to address the endogeneity of trade and income before one can draw causal conclusions. Turning to Panel B, we first note that we reject the null of underidentification in every case, and fail to reject the validity of the instruments at conventional levels in all cases except for toxic water releases with Specification I.
In terms of the results, for toxic air releases, we continue to find strong support for the theoretical model. In particular, in all three specifications we reject the null that the two trade variables are jointly insignificant, as well as equality between the two trade variables using Specifications I and II. Moreover, while the coefficients on all the trade variables are negative, the coefficients on international trade intensity are greater in absolute value and statistically significant. However, for toxic land/underground releases, total toxic releases, releases of carcinogens, and CO 2 emissions the results are less favorable for the theory.
For land/underground and total toxic releases, we reject the null that the two trade variables are jointly insignificant. Moreover, only the coefficients on intranational trade intensity are negative and statistically significant in each specification, as in Panel A, but we fail to reject equality between the two trade variables in each case, as in Panel A. For releases of carcinogens and CO 2 emissions, we reject the null that the two trade variables are jointly insignificant, as well as equality of the two trade effects for carcinogens in all three specifications and CO 2 emissions in Specification III. Specifically, we find that greater intranational trade intensity leads to fewer releases of carcinogens, whereas international trade intensity leads to more releases and more CO 2 emissions.
Discussion
In sum, we reach three main conclusions from the empirical analysis. First and most importantly, our results are consonant with the existing literature. Specifically, there is little evidence of harmful effects of either intra-or international trade, and in many cases greater trade intensity is found to be beneficial.
Second, when we do not include state and province fixed effects in the estimation, we find fairly robust evidence that greater international trade is more beneficial for the environment than intranational trade.
Moreover, aside from simply being statistically significant, the effects are quite sizeable from an economic perspective. Thus, we find strong support for the our theoretical model. However, when we push the data,
given the sample size, and include state and province fixed effects, there is no clear ranking among the two types of trade. Specifically, the results for toxic air releases continue to support our theoretical model:
negative effects of both types of trade, with international trade having a significantly larger impact in absolute value. For other pollution measures, namely releases of carcinogens and CO 2 emissions, there is some evidence that while greater intranational trade intensity leads to lower pollution, greater international trade intensity leads to higher pollution. For toxic water, land/underground, and total releases, there is no evidence of a statistically different impact among the two types of trade.
How do we reconcile these disparate GMM results when including or not including fixed effects? To begin, it is important to realize that it is not necessarily the case that the fixed effects estimates are to be preferred as we are not simply comparing OLS to fixed effects estimation. Rather, we are comparing instrumental variables estimation with and without fixed effects. Thus, there are two main differences between the models with and without fixed effects. First, when not including the fixed effects, any time invariant, state-or province-specific unobservables are relegated to the error term. This has the effect of making it more difficult to find valid exclusion restrictions for the endogenous variables. However, since
we test the validity of the instruments when both including and not including fixed effects, and the models fair well in both cases, this does not appear to be a concern.
Second, inclusion of the fixed effects changes the variation that is used to identify the model. As is well known, fixed effects estimators identify the coefficients solely from the within variation in the data.
Aside from issues of efficiency, in an instrumental variables context, this can have additional important
implications. In particular, in the case where the impact of the endogenous variable is heterogeneous across observations, the instrumental variable estimate corresponds to the average effect for observations whose value of the endogenous variable is influenced by variation in the instrument(s). In our case, when not including fixed effects, all of the variation in predicted intra-and international trade intensity,
arising from variation in all of the covariates included in (17) , is used to identify the effects of trade on the environment. However, in the fixed effects models, only the within variation in the predicted trade variables is used. This eliminates most of the variation in predicted trade since the geographical determinants of trade are time invariant; the within variation in predicted trade arises solely due to the fact that (17) includes state/province by time effects, rather than just state/province effects. 20 Thus, in a heterogeneous "treatment effects" framework, the GMM with fixed effects models potentially identifies the effects of trade for a very select sub-sample of the data: states or provinces whose trade intensity varies due to deviations in the state/province by time effects from the overall time invariant state/province effects.
As such, given the identification strategy employed in the analysis, our preferred estimates are the GMM estimates excluding the fixed effects. Not only do these estimates use more of the variation in the predicted trade variables, but perhaps more importantly, they admit variation due to the exogenous, time invariant geographic determinants of trade included in (17).
Conclusion
This paper devises a new model of trade and environment interactions that highlights the intra-industry nature of trade between and within industrialized nations. We show how a region's trade intensity correlates with greater product diversity. The welfare gain from increased variety generates a wealth effect akin to 20 About 2% (1%) of the variation in predicted intranational (international) trade intensity is within variation.
conventional income effects, spurring demand for greater environmental quality. This wealth effect is independent of the type of trade, such that all types of trade, regardless of trade partner, are good for the environment.
Our theoretical model suggests that trade between jurisdictions has a second beneficial effect. In regions with high trade intensity, consumers enjoy a diverse range of product choices and will have consumption baskets containing many varieties that are not produced locally. As the prices and range of foreign varieties available are invariant to local regulation, in regions where trade intensity is high, consumer choice is less sensitive to environmental policy-i.e. trade decouples consumer and regulatory choices-rendering strict regulation more attractive. Because some regulations governing toxic releases and other polluting behavior are set federally, this decoupling effect will be strongest for international trade. In sum, our theoretical models suggests all types of trade are good for the environment, but that international trade is better.
We use data on provincial and state toxic releases and CO 2 emissions in Canada and the United States, as well as intra-and international trade to test these hypotheses. Our preferred results strongly support the predictions of our theoretical model, as well as the existing empirical literature. Specifically, there is little evidence of harmful effects of either intra-or international trade, and in many cases greater trade intensity is found to be beneficial. Furthermore, we find fairly robust evidence that greater international trade is more beneficial for the environment than intranational trade. Thus, in the trade-environment debate, we find that national borders do matter, but in a beneficial way, although both types of trade are good for reducing pollution.
A Appendix
A.1 Second Order Condition for an interior maximum Differentiating (11) with respect to e gives (1−ρ)η+ρ at e o . Substituting values into (20) , evaluating at e = e o and collecting terms gives
As H is convex and σ is positive, "B" is greater than unity. Moreover, because 1 + (ρ − 1)(1 − η) is positive, the sum labeled "A" has its largest value at μ = 0 and so a sufficient condition for
Canceling like terms reveals (21) holds whenever ρ(1 − η) ≥ 0, which is always true. Other covariates included in Specification I in addition to a constant: ln(GDP/pop), ln(GDP/pop) 2 , ln(area/pop), and a time dummy. Specification II includes the covariates from Specification I plus a dummy for Canadian provinces and its interaction with the time dummy. Specification III includes the covariates in Specification II plus ln(pop), ln(pop) 2 , and the unemployment rate. GMM estimates obtained using predicted intra-and international trade intensity, percent of females over age 25 with a high school diploma, percent of males over age 25 with a high school diploma, percent of females over age 25 with a college diploma, percent of males over age 25 with a college diploma, median age of females, and median age of males as exclusion restrictions. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state/province level.
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